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Do Frictions Matter in the Labor Market? 
Accessions, Separations and Minimum Wage Effects
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We measure labor market frictions using a strategy that bridges design-based and structural 
approaches: estimating an equilibrium search model using reduced-form minimum wage 
elasticities identified from border discontinuities and fitted with Bayesian and LIML methods. 
We begin by providing the first test of U.S. minimum wage effects on labor market flows and 
find negative effects on employment flows, but not levels. Separations and accessions fall 
among restaurants and teens, especially those with low tenure. Our estimated parameters of 
a search model with wage posting and heterogeneous workers and firms imply that frictions 





What are the effects of minimum wage increases on the labor market? This is a question of 
long-standing interest to both economists and policy makers. Additionally, what can we learn 
about the nature of the labor market by looking at responses to minimum wage changes? In 
this paper, we compare areas in the US across state borders with different minimum wages 
and find some striking results: while increases in minimum wages do not seem to affect 
employment for workers in highly affected groups (those working in industries like 
restaurants, or teens generally), we do find that their earnings increase and their turnover 
rates fall sharply.  We next use this set of results, along with new models of the labor market 
that focus on job search, to answer the following question: are there features of the labor 
market that deviate from a competitive “ideal” in important ways, and do these features help 
explain why minimum wages may tend to reduce turnover more than reduce jobs? Our study 
finds an affirmative answer to both these questions. 
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The analysis of employment ﬂows can provide important clues about the functioning of the
labor market and shed new light on long-standing debates in economics. One such debate
concerns the eﬀects of minimum wage increases on employment levels, particularly for low-
skilled workers. If the perfectly competitive benchmark is a good ﬁrst approximation for the
low-wage labor market, an increase in the minimum wage above a competitive equilibrium
causes an unambiguous reduction in labor demand. If, however, there are substantial search
frictions in the labor market, the intuition from the perfectly competitive model may be
misleading. In models with search friction, equilibrium employment is constrained not only
by labor demand, but also possibly by labor supply. Models with labor market frictions
where ﬁrms have some wage-setting power can therefore explain why increasing the minimum
wage might not necessarily reduce employment and, in some cases, may increase it.
At least since Card and Krueger (1995), search frictions have been posited to explain the
seemingly anomalous result that minimum wage increases are not clearly associated with
job losses. In Card and Krueger’s dynamic monospony model, separation and recruitment
rates are functions of the wage rate and the model allows positive ﬁrm-level labor supply
elasticities. They argue that empirically plausible magnitudes of the labor supply elasticities
facing a ﬁrm are consistent with small positive or zero eﬀects of a minimum wage increase
on employment levels. Subsequent ﬁrm-level studies, such as those surveyed by Ashenfelter,
Farber and Ransom (2010), have indeed found labor supply elasticities consisent with sub-
stantial wage-setting power. But while the ﬁrm-level evidence on monopsony is important,
these papers do not consider interaction among ﬁrms and workers, even though a minimum
wage mandate aﬀects a host of ﬁrms–and possibly diﬀerentially.
In the hypothetical case of a single ﬁrm facing a wage increase due to the policy, the labor
supply elasticity facing the ﬁrm can be approximated as twice the elasticity of separations
with respect to the average wage (Manning 2003). In this case, we could use the minimum
wage as an instrument to estimate the separation elasticity of wage: the larger the separation
elasticity, the more competitive is the market. However, this logic breaks down when many
ﬁrms are subjected to a common policy shock. On the one hand, even if the market is fairly
competitive, separations may not fall as much because some other ﬁrms are also increasing
wages. On the other hand, by narrowing the wage distribution, the minimum wage may
reduce the odds of workers getting better oﬀers–which is more likely to occur precisely when
the market is initially less competitive and there is a wider wage dispersion. Therefore, to
estimate the competitiveness of the labor market using minimum wage changes, we need
additional information about how the policy aﬀects earnings and employment, and some
2information about the wage distribution, along with a model of wage and employment
determination in the labor market.
In this paper we use a relatively new dataset–the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI)–
to estimate the reduced form minimum wage elasticities of average earnings, employment
ﬂows as well as employment levels, and then use these elasticities (along with a measure
of equilibrium wage dispersion) to estimate the parameters of an equilibrium model with
search frictions. The data permit us to estimate the responses of local labor-market-level
separation, accession and turnover rates for high-impact demographic and industry groups:
teens and restaurant workers. To our knowledge, these are the ﬁrst estimates of the eﬀect
of minimum wage increases on employment ﬂows using nationally representative U.S. data.
Our estimated minimum wage elasticities are based on a border-discontinuity design that
eliminates the spatial heterogeneity bias in many previous studies. We compare county pairs
straddling a border with minimum wage diﬀerences, the approach taken in Dube, Lester and
Reich (2010), hereafter DLR, who speciﬁcally look at the eﬀect on restaurant employment
levels.
Next, we examine the implications of our quasi-experimental ﬁndings within the context
of an equilibrium search model with wage posting (Burdett and Mortensen 1998, hereafter
BM), as extended by Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg (1999, hereafter BRV) to in-
corporate heterogeneous workers and ﬁrms. We estimate the parameters of the BM-BRV
model with a limited information maximum likelihood approach. Speciﬁcally, we search
over proposed parameters using a simulated annealing algorithm to maximize the likelihood
of having observed the empirical distribution of the reduced-form elasticities and a measure
of wage dispersion (minimum to mean wage ratio). We also estimate Bayesian posterior
distributions for the parameters using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC).
We ﬁnd striking evidence that separations, new hires, and turnover rates for teens and
restaurant workers fall substantially following a minimum wage increase–with most of the
reductions coming within the ﬁrst year of the increase. We also ﬁnd substantial positive
eﬀects on average earnings. But we do not ﬁnd employment elasticities that are statistically
distinguishable from zero for either teens or restaurant workers; nor do we ﬁnd any evidence
of labor-labor substitution within the restaurant workforce. When we estimate the model
parameters to match these reduced-form elasticities, both point and interval estimates sug-
gest a sizeable degree of wage-setting power, with ﬁrm-level labor supply elasticities in the 4
to 10 range. Our estimates of labor market frictions are consistent with the recent ﬁrm-level
studies surveyed by Ashenfelter, Farber and Ransom (2010), and with parameters used in
macroeconomic calibrations, such as Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2009). We ﬁnd that the
increased competition from a minimum wage hike partly explains the small employment
3eﬀects.
Our paper relates to two distinct literatures. First, a handful of papers have directly
estimated the reduced-form eﬀects of minimum wages on equilibrium turnover, separations,
or tenure. Portugual and Cardoso (2006) ﬁnd that teen separations fall substantially after a
minimum wage increase in Portugal–results that are broadly similar to our own. However,
the national-level policy change used for estimation makes it more like a single case study,
raising concerns about both the identiﬁcation strategy and inference. Furthermore, while
they refer to the Burdett-Mortensen model as a possible explanation of their ﬁndings, they
are not able to relate their reduced form estimates to a measure of labor market frictions– a
key contribution of this paper. More recently, Brochu and Green (2011) use Canadian data
and ﬁnd that teen hires and layoﬀs decline in the year after a minimum wage increase but
quits decline by much less; they ﬁnd some reductions in employment levels as well. While
quits are only around 38 percent of separations in their “low skilled” Canadian sample,
JOLTS data for the U.S. indicate that quits accounted for 70 percent of the separations in
the Accomodation and Food Services sector (mainly restaurants) during our sample period.
This diﬀerence suggests that the layoﬀ channel that Brochu and Green highlight has less
relevance for the U.S. context. Unfortunately, the small number of Canadian provinces
(and hence policy clusters) also raise serious concerns about identiﬁcation and inference.
For example their empirical strategy cannot rule out that heterogeneous spatial trends are
driving some of their ﬁndings on layoﬀs and employment–which we show are quite important
in the U.S. context. A few studies examine the eﬀects of wage mandates on labor market
ﬂows in much more limited contexts. Dube, Naidu and Reich (2007) estimate employment
and tenure eﬀects in a single city–San Francisco–in response to a citywide wage mandate.
The eﬀects of “living-wage” laws on ﬁrm-based employee turnover have been studied in
speciﬁc cities and sectors–for example, Fairris (2005); Howes (2005); and Reich, Hall and
Jacobs (2005). 1
Overall, compared to existing papers, we are able to estimate the responses of employ-
ment ﬂows to minimum wage changes using much richer variation and a more credible
identiﬁcation strategy. And we directly assess the importance of labor market frictions by
using these reduced-form results to recover the parameters of an equilibrium model.
Second, our paper relates to the literature that estimates minimum wage eﬀects empir-
ically within the context of labor market models with search frictions. Flynn (2006) and
Flynn and Mabli (2008) estimate search models with binding minimum wages. Both papers
estimate the parameters of the model using moment conditions (changes in cross-sectional
proportions and transition probabilites in and out of jobs).2 The estimation strategy does
1 See also the survey in Manning (2010).
2See also the survey by Chowdry et al. 2009.
4not exploit actual minimum wage variation; indeed, their estimation requires a stationary
environment in which the minimum wage is ﬁxed. A similar comment applies to empirical
studies such as Eckstein and Wolpin (1990), Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg (1999)
and Mortensen (2003). These studies also use variants of the Burdett-Mortensen model to
document the importance of frictions in the labor market and the structural estimation in
these papers are implemented without any direct use of the minimum wage variation. For
example, Bontemps et al. (1999) invert the observed wage distribution to back out the
distribution of productivity and then the other parameters in the model within a stationary
environment. As a consequence, while the estimated models in these papers have important
implications for minimum wage eﬀects (including on observable dimensions such as employ-
ment level and turnover), the model-generated elasticities are not directly compared to their
empirical counterparts.3 In contrast, matching the empirical and model-generated responses
is precisely our approach here, and is similar in spirit to the estimation of macroeconomic
models using impulse response matching (e.g., Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin 2010).
Therefore, we see our paper as complementing existing structural evidence in the minimum
wage literature.
Our paper also speaks to the debate on “design based” versus “model based” approaches
to empirical work (e.g., Angrist and Pischke 2010, Sims 2010). In our case, carefully es-
timated reduced-form elasticities using a border-discontinuity design are critical for policy
purposes. But we also use them to make inferences about model parameters and answer an
economically important question that a purely reduced-form approach cannot answer: how
important are labor market frictions in explaining the eﬀects of the policy? We think this
is a fruitful approach to bridge design and model based inference.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We discuss our dataset, sample and our
identiﬁcation strategy in Section 2 and report our reduced-form minimum wage elasticities
in Section 3. Section 4 presents the equilibrium search model, and uses the reduced-form
elasticities to estimate the parameters of the wage-posting model and Section 5 concludes.
2D a t a a n d E s t i m a t i o n o f R e d u c e d F o r m E l a s t i c i t i e s
2.1 The Quarterly Workforce Indicators dataset
The recent minimum wage literature in the U.S. has drawn primarily upon two datasets:
the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, or QCEW (e.g., Dube, Lester and Reich
3A more recent example of a similar strategy as Bontemps et al. is Shephard (2010), who estimates an
extended version of the BRV model using pre-reform data and simulates the labor supply and equilibrium
eﬀects of the British Working Family Tax reform aﬀecting low income workers.
52010; Addison and Blackburn 2008) and the Current Population Survey (e.g., Neumark and
Wascher 2006; Allegretto, Dube and Reich 2011). The QCEW’s advantage lies in providing
essentially a full census of employment at the county and industry level. The CPS’s advan-
tage lies in providing the worker-level demographic data needed to estimate employment
eﬀects by age or gender. Neither data source contains the type of longitudinal ﬁrm-worker
linkages that enables researchers to test hypotheses regarding turnover reductions in re-
sponse to a minimum wage change.
In this paper we use the QWI, which combines many of the virtues of both the QCEW
and the CPS, while also allowing a richer analysis of dynamic responses to minimum wage
changes.4 The QWI data oﬀer employment counts and average wages by detailed industry
at the county level for speciﬁed age and gender groupings, and as well quarterly ﬁgures
for hires, separations and turnover rates. We use ﬁve diﬀerent dependent variables in our
empirical analysis: (1) Earnings: Average monthly earnings of employees who worked on
the last day of the reference quarter in county i.( 2 )Employment: Number of jobs on the
last day of the quarter in county i.( 3 ) Accessions (Hires): The number of workers who
started a new job in the speciﬁed quarter in county i. This variable includes new hires as
well as workers who have been rehired with the same employer within the last four quarters.
(4) Separations: Number of workers whose job with a given employer ended in the speciﬁed




The ﬁrst two variables are consistent with the data presented in the QCEW, while
the three ﬂow variables—hires, separations, and turnover rate—are unique to the QWI. In
addition, the QWI oﬀers separate tabulations of these outcome variables calculated only for
workers who are employed at the ﬁrm for at least one full quarter.5 We refer to this sample
as workers with “tenure greater than 1 quarter.”
Our paper focuses on labor turnover in response to minimum wage changes within a
speciﬁc low-wage industry or a speciﬁed demographic group. Low-wage labor markets have
long been recognized as highly volatile, with very short employment spells and frequent
shifts between labor market participation and non-participation. Consequently, earnings,
4The QWI data are produced though a partnership between the U.S. Census Bureau and various state
Labor Market Information (LMI) oﬃces. This partnership, called the Local Employment Dynamics (LED)
program, combines administrative data from each participating state’s unemployment insurance ﬁlings
(which also make up the current QCEW) with current demographic information from other administrative
censuses.Thompson (2009) also uses the QWI data to evaluate the eﬀect of minimum wage on teen and
young adult employment. Thompson’s primary concern is whether the “bite” of the minimum wage explains
the magnitude of the employment eﬀect. In contrast, our focus is on separations and turnover.
5More precisely, according to the Census Bureau, the >1q hires measure equals the number of workers
who began work with an employer in the previous quarter and remain with the same employer in the current
quarter; and the >1q separations measure equals the number of workers who had a job for at least a full
quarter and then the job ended in the current quarter.
6employment and turnover calculations may vary considerably with the proportion of workers
who begin or complete job spells during the quarter. Thus, we present our empirical esti-
mates for earnings, employment, hires, separations, and turnover for workers “at all tenure
levels” as well as for those with “tenure greater than 1 quarter.”
2.2 Sample construction
State participation in the QWI program varies by year. Four states (IL, MD, WA and WI)
began to participate in 1990, with additional states joining during the 1990s and 2000s.
The vast majority of states had entered the QWI program by the late 1990s and early
2000s. Consequently, starting the sample in 1990 would generate highly unbalanced panels.
Therefore, we limit our sample period to 2001q1 through 2008q4.6
2.2.1 Demographic groups and industries
We estimate minimum wage eﬀects for two broad employment categories, both of which
have been the focus of much previous empirical research and which include high shares
of minimum wage workers. The ﬁrst employment group consists of teens. Using the de-
mographic information contained in the QWI we present minimum wage elasticities for
all teens aged 14-18. 7 The second high-impact group is the restaurant industry. In 2006
restaurants employed 29.9 percent of all workers paid within ten percent of the state/federal
minimum wage, making restaurants the single largest employer of minimum wage workers
at the 3-digit industry level (authors’ analysis of the 2006 CPS). Restaurants are also the
most intensive user of minimum wage workers, with 33 percent of restaurant workers earn-
ing within ten percent of the minimum wage (using 3-digit level industry data). We also
provide additional estimates within the restaurant sample by age categories (teens, young
adults who are 19-24 years old, and all other adults), and gender and subsector to test for
substitution among these groups The QWI does not contain information on race, ethnicity
or education levels.
2.2.2 Contiguous County Pair Sample
Our empirical strategy is based upon diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates from a panel of con-
tiguous county pairs that straddle state borders. Our QWI sample consists of the 1,063
6The dataset we obtained from the Cornell University Virtual Data Repository—which hosts the QWI
ﬂat ﬁles—included data through 2009q1 at that time. Since the hires, separations and turnover variables
with tenure greater than one quarter require information for a leading quarter, the last quarter for which
these variables are deﬁned is 2008q4.
7The youngest age category reported in the QWI is 14-18.
7counties that border another state. Collectively, these border counties comprise 1,169 unique
county pairs. Some of these pairs have a minimum wage diﬀerential and others do not. In
addition, in any single regression we limit the sample to those counties that have a full
panel of disclosed data. As is the case with the QCEW, the QWI does not report values
for cells in which too few establishments comprise the sample and/or where the identity
of a given establishment could be disclosed. We merge information on overall local unem-
ployment rates and the value of each state’s minimum wage in each quarter with the QWI
county-pair panel dataset.8
What are the eﬀects of restricting our sample to border-county pairs? Table 1 presents
the means and standard deviations for our ﬁve outcome variables for all 2,960 U.S. counties
and for the 1,063 contiguous counties in our border-county pair sample. We display these
measures for all private sector employees, all employed teens, and all restaurant workers,
and separately as well for workers at all tenure levels and those with at least one quarter
of tenure. Depending upon the worker group and tenure level, average earnings are 0.5
to 1 percent lower in the border-county pair sample, while average employment is 7 to 10
percent lower. Hires, separations and turnover rates are virtually identical in both samples.
We surmise that the border-county sample is composed of somewhat smaller counties, but
this diﬀerence is modest. All the other characteristics of the two samples are quite close.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for our ﬁve outcome variables, both for “all tenure”
and “tenure ≥1 quarter,” as well as the minimum wage. The sample size for each variable,
which diﬀers depending on the industry or demographic group in question, ranges from
28,000 to 66,112.
2.3 Empirical Strategy to Estimate Reduced-Form Elasticities
To measure the impact of minimum wage changes on earnings, employment levels and
employment ﬂows, we follow the research design proposed in DLR of generalizing the local
case study approach by comparing outcomes from all U.S. counties on either side of a
state border. As shown in detail in DLR, this research design has desirable properties for
identifying minimum wage eﬀects. Measuring labor market outcomes from an immediately
adjacent county provides a better control group, since ﬁrms and workers on either side
are generally aﬀected by the same idiosyncratic local trends and experiencemacroeconomic
shocks at roughly the same time. The inability to control for such trends and shocks can
produce highly misleading estimates.
8We treat the county of San Francisco, California as a separate policy unit and compare it with neighbor-
ing counties. San Francisco has a county-level minimum wage that applies to all workers and establishments,
analogous to a state minimum wage in every respect.
8Our cross-border research design begins with a panel dataset consisting of all contiguous
county pairs that straddle a state border. We use two diﬀerent speciﬁcations to estimate
the model. Speciﬁcation 1 includes controls for common-time ﬁxed eﬀects, which we call
the “canonical” approach.
(1) yk
ipt = α + β ln(MWit)+δ ln(empTOT
it )+γ ln(popit)+φi + τt + ￿ipt
Here yk
ipt refers to the value of the dependent variable–which could refer to the log of
earnings, employment, separations, or hires, or the turnover rate–in county i,i nc o u n t y -
pair p,a tt i m et,f o re a c ho ft h es p e c i ﬁ ci n d u s t r yo rd e m o g r a p h i cg r o u p sk (e.g., restaurant
workers or teens). Note that a given county can be part of multiple county pairs if it borders
more than one adjacent county. In addition, given the time frame of our panel dataset, a
given county can be either a “treated” or “control” unit, depending on the timing of minimum
wage changes between the aﬀected states. The coeﬃcient on the minimum wage variable
ln(MWit) is the primary coeﬃcient of interest; it is reported in each of the tables below.
Speciﬁcation 1 also includes controls for the natural log of total private sector employ-
ment and population in each county.9 The φi term represents a county ﬁxed-eﬀect. Cru-
cially, the common time ﬁxed-eﬀects τt are assumed to be constant across counties, which
rules out possibly heterogeneous trends.10
In Speciﬁcation 1, conditional on covariates and the county ﬁxed eﬀect, all other counties
are used as controls for a treated county facing a minimum wage hike–regardless of their
geographic locations. In contrast, our preferred identiﬁcation strategy consists of making
as e r i e so fl o c a l i z e dc o m p a r i s o n swithin contiguous county pairs. This is represented in
Speciﬁcation 2 below:
(2) yk
ipt = α + β ln(MWit)+δ ln(empTOT
it )+γ ln(popit)+φi + τpt + ￿ipt
This speciﬁcation is analogous to Speciﬁcation 1 in every respect except for the inclusion
of a pair-speciﬁc time eﬀect τpt, rather than a common time eﬀect. This change is critical in
that minimum wage eﬀects are estimated only using diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences in the outcome
variable within each pair. Thus our identifying assumption for this local speciﬁcation is is
that conditional on covariates and county ﬁxed eﬀects, minimum wage diﬀerences within
the pair are uncorrelated with the diﬀerences in the residual outcome in either county. This
is much weaker than the assumpiton in the canonical Speciﬁcation 1.
Note that the contiguous county pair sample stacks each border county pair, so that a
particular county will be in the sample as many times as it can be paired with a neighbor
across the border. This property allows us to mean diﬀerence all the variables within
each pair-period group, avoiding estimating τpt. Hence, Speciﬁcation 2 uses the within-pair
variation across all pairs and eﬀectively pools the estimates.
9We use county-level Census Bureau population data, which are reported on an annual basis.
10In the remainder of this paper, we will use the term common time eﬀects for τt.
9Since policy is set at the state level, we cluster our standard errors at the state level.
However, the presence of a single county in multiple pairs along a border segment induces
am e c h a n i c a lc o r r e l a t i o na c r o s ss t a t ep a i r s ,a n dp o t e n t i a l l ya l o n ga ne n t i r eb o r d e rs e g m e n t .
To account for this source of bias, we additionally cluster on the border segment using
multi-dimensional clustering (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller 2007).
3E m p i r i c a l F i n d i n g s
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Since the QWI is relatively unfamiliar to most economists, here we provide some additional
descriptive statistics in Table 2 for the workforce at large. As Table 2 indicates, the sample
means for the outcome variables vary considerably by age and industry, as well as by tenure
level. Earnings levels are much lower among teens, young adults and restaurant workers
than among all older workers; women earn less than men; and workers with job tenure ≥
1 quarter earn more than workers with less than one quarter of job tenure.11 These are
expected patterns. The proportion of workers with less than one quarter of tenure ranges
from 31 percent among teens, to 26 percent among limited-service restaurants and 23 percent
among full-service restaurants.
Hire, separation and turnover rates also vary with age, industry, gender, and tenure
level. Each of these three rates is higher for younger workers than for older workers. Teens,
for example, have a turnover rate of 62 percent, followed by 53 percent among young adults,
and 18 percent for older adults. The three rates are also higher among restaurant workers
than among all workers, and much higher among workers with job tenure of less than one
quarter. For diﬀerences by age, industry and tenure, each of these variables is inversely
correlated with earnings levels: hire, separation and turnover rates are lower among higher-
paid workers. These patterns are similar to those found in previous research.
Men have a slightly greater rate of turnover (23 percent) than women (21 percent).
However, among workers with job tenure≥ 1q u a r t e r ,t h eh i r e ,s e p a r a t i o na n dt e n u r er a t e s
are virtually identical for males and females.
Although not shown in Table 2, the data that underlie the separation rates yield sur-
prising indications of how concentrated separations are in short-tenure jobs. Among all
workers, jobs with less than one quarter of tenure account for 10.1 percent of all jobs, but
55.7 percent of all separations. In the restaurant industry, separations are as concentrated
in short-term jobs, but such jobs are three times more common than in all industries. In
11 Some of these pay diﬀerentials reﬂect diﬀerences in hours worked, experience and skill level, but our
data do not permit us to quantify these eﬀects.
10restaurants, jobs with less than one quarter of tenure account for 31 percent of all jobs
and 60.5 percent of all separations. This duration dependence of separation is useful for
interpreting the results on the the turnover elasticity in the next section.
3.2 Main results
We present in Table 3 our main ﬁndings on the eﬀects of minimum wage increases for
teens and for restaurant workers. For each group we report estimates for ﬁve outcome
variables and using two speciﬁcations, one with controls for common time eﬀects (the
canonical model), and the second with controls for county-pair speciﬁc time eﬀects (the
preferred model). Both are reported in the table to demonstrate the relevance of our border
discontinuity-based research design. The text usually refers to our preferred speciﬁcation,
except when to show how spatial heterogeneity can produce misleading estimates using the
canonical model.
We begin by showing that the minimum wage is binding for each of these groups. The
estimated eﬀects on average monthly earnings are positive and highly signiﬁcant–for both
speciﬁcations and for both groups of workers. For each group of workers, the canonical
speciﬁcations (cols. 1, 3) yields a somewhat smaller eﬀect on earnings than our preferred
border-discontinuity specﬁcation (cols. 2, 4). The elasticity of earnings is 0.161 among
all teen workers and 0.213 among all restaurant workers.12 These ﬁndings put to rest any
concerns that restricting the identifying variation to cross-border pairs leads to a lack of
actual earnings diﬀerential across the treated and control units.
We turn next to the estimated employment eﬀects, shown in the second row of Table
3. We highlight two results in this row. First, although the canonical speciﬁcation (col. 1)
yields an estimated employment eﬀect of -0.200 for teen workers, once we account for spatial
heterogeneity the coeﬃcient in border-discontinuity speciﬁcation (col. 2) is very small in
magnitude (-0.039) and it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The canonical estimates
on teens are very close to those found by researchers using the CPS and similar models
(Neumark and Wascher 2007; Allegretto, Dube and Reich 2010). In other words, we ﬁnd
strong evidence that spatial heterogeneity produces a spurious disemployment eﬀect for teen
workers, thereby demonstrating the scope of the disemployment bias among studies using
the canonical speciﬁcation. Second, we replicate the qualititive ﬁndings in DLR using the
QWI sample: among all restaurant workers the canonical estimate of the employment eﬀect
is -0.121 and statistically signiﬁcant. But accounting for spatial heterogeneity reduces the
12 The elasticities for teens and for restaurant workers are extremely close to our estimates for these
groups using the CPS for teens (Allegretto, Dube and Reich 2010) and the QCEW for restaurants (Dube,
Lester and Reich 2010).
11eﬀect (in magnitude) to -0.057 and renders it indistinguishable from zero.
Finally, we consider the estimates of the ﬂow outcomes–hires, separations and turnover
rates. The ﬁndings here contrast sharply with those on employment levels. As rows three
to ﬁve of Table 3 indicate, hires, separations and turnover rate fall substantially and sig-
niﬁcantly with minimum wage increases. For our preferred speciﬁcations (columns 2 and
4), the separation elasticity is substantial both for teens (-0.253) and for restaurant workers
(-0.319). The accession (hires) elasticities are quite similar to the separation elasticities–
which is consistent with the responses reﬂecting steady state comparisons. For each group,
the estimated eﬀects for separations and hires are smaller for Speciﬁcation 2 than for Spec-
iﬁcation 1. This is to be expected because the downward bias in employment estimates in
Speciﬁcation 1 mechanically imparts an analogous bias for the separations and hires elastic-
ities, but not for the turnover rate elasticity, or any other rate elasticities. (The separation
rate elasticity is equal to the separation elasticity less the employment elasticity.)
Summarizing to this point, we ﬁnd that our border-discontinuity estimates ﬁnd strong
positive responses to earnings in response to a minimum wage increase. This increase in
earnings is met with a change in employment levels that is indistinguishable from zero.
However, we ﬁnd clear evidence that employment ﬂows (hires and separations) both fall
strongly in response to the policy change. And these patterns hold whether we consider a
high-impact demographic group (teenagers) or a high-impact industry (restaurants).
3.3 Robustness checks
Table 4 presents three robustness checks for our main results, using our preferred speciﬁ-
cation and estimated for teens and for restaurant workers. One concern is the presence in
our sample of geographically large counties, which are located primarily in the western U.S.
For these counties, border contiguity need not imply proximity of population centers. As
ac h e c k ,c o l u m n sl a b e l e d1a n d4a d dar e s t r i c t i o nf o rc o u n t ys i z e( <2 , 0 0 0s q u a r em i l e s ) .
This restriction does not substantially aﬀect any of the estimated eﬀects on earnings, em-
ployment, hires, separations and turnover rates.
A second concern is that the ﬂow results for teens and restaurant workers may be aﬀected
by unobserved overall county labor market trends. To check for this possibility, columns
labeled 2 and 5 in Table 4 include the overall private sector level outcome (separation,
turnover, etc.) as an additional control. Unlike employment, a disproportionately large
share of overall separations and new hires come from the low wage sector. For this reason,
inclusion of the overall private sector ﬂow measure is a particularly tough test. For teens,
adding this control reduces the absolute value of the ﬂow coeﬃcients, the hires coeﬃcient be-
comes insigniﬁcant, while separations and turnover estimates retain statistical signiﬁcance.
12For restaurant workers, adding this control also reduces the estimates somewhat, but they
continue to be statistically signiﬁcant. Overall, we conclude that the reductions in ﬂows
in low wage sectors and demographic groups are not primarily driven by unobserved local
trends in ﬂows.
The group of columns labeled 3 and 6 in Table 4 report results from a test for the presence
of pre-existing trends that might confound the estimates, as well as for possible lagged eﬀects.
We estimate a single speciﬁcation that includes both a one year (4 quarters) lead ln(MWt+4)
and a one year (4 quarters) lag ln(MWt−4),i na d d i t i o nt ot h ec o n t e m p o r a n e o u sm i n i m u m
wage ln(MWt).13 All three of the coeﬃcients are reported in the table. We do not ﬁnd
any statistically signiﬁcant (or quantitatively large) leading or lagged terms for any of our
outcomes. Moreover, including the leading and lagged minimum wage does not attenuate
our statistically signiﬁcant contemporary coeﬃcients for the ﬂow measures reported in Table
3. These results provide additional internal validity to our research design and rules out the
possibility that the large reductions in the ﬂows are driven by pre-existing trends. They also
show that the reduction in ﬂows represents a permanent change in response to the policy
and not transitional dynamics. The latter observation justiﬁes our use of these elasticities
in the structural estimation below.
3.4 Eﬀects by tenure on the job
As mentioned during our discussion of the descriptive statistics, turnover generally is con-
centrated among short-term jobs–those of one-quarter or less. Since not all teens may be
in minimum wage jobs (or in jobs whose wages are aﬀected by minimum wage policy), we
might expect the eﬀect of minimum wage on separations to have a tenure-speciﬁc eﬀect.
Lower-tenure workers are, ceteris paribus, more likely to be those who are minimum wage
workers. In this section, we provide some additional evidence that is consistentwith the
interpretation that minimum wage has a causal eﬀect on separations.
First, if minimum wage increases reduce labor market ﬂows, we would expect to ﬁnd
they also reduce the fraction of workers with such short-term jobs. Columns 1 and 4
of Table 5 provide estimated eﬀects on the fraction short-term, for teens and restaurant
workers, respectively. The estimated eﬀect is negative for both groups, although statistically
signiﬁcant only for the restaurant sample. To investigate further how minimum wage eﬀects
vary by tenure, we estimate our preferred speciﬁcation for workers who have at least one
quarter of job tenure.14 Table 5 displays our previous results for workers at all tenure levels
13The coeﬃcient for ln(MWt) represents the short run elasticity, while the sum of the coeﬃcients for
ln(MWt) and ln(MWt−4) represents the long run elasticity.
14The QWI data do not provide breakdowns for tenure longer than one quarter.
13(column 2 for teens and 5 for restaurant workers, as well as those who have more than one
quarter of tenure (columns 3 and 6).
When we limit attention to workers with at least one quarter of job tenure, the earnings
estimates for both teens and restaurant workers are somewhat smaller than among workers
of all tenure levels and they continue to be statistically signiﬁcant. The somewhat smaller
magnitude of the earnings elasticity for the sample with more tenure is consistent with the
idea that higher tenure workers tend to be higher wage workers. Employment eﬀects for this
sample are again very small and not signiﬁcant. Among workers with at least one quarter
of tenure, the estimated eﬀects on hires and separations are smaller than among workers of
all tenure levels and they are no longer signiﬁcant.
These ﬁndings suggest minimum wage changes seem to reduce turnover more sharply for
workers with lower tenure level–precisely those whose wages are more likely to be aﬀected by
the policy. However, since the sample of those with less than one quarter of tenure may also
be aﬀected by the policy change, we need to be cautious in interpreting these estimates.15
3.5 Labor-labor substitution? Eﬀects on employment shares of dif-
ferent demographic groups
An important question in the minimum wage literature concerns whether higher minimum
wages induce employers to substitute away from some demographic groups. Previous re-
searchers, such as Neumark and Wascher (2007), who use the canonical ﬁxed-eﬀects speci-
ﬁcation and ﬁnd disemployment eﬀects, also report substitution away from teens and lower
skilled workers. Although we do not ﬁnd disemployment eﬀects, substitution eﬀects might
still be present, aﬀecting the shares of diﬀerent groups in particular jobs.
To address this question directly we report in Table 6 estimates of the impact of minimum
wage increases on outcomes for the demographic groups in our key industry–restaurants.
The ﬁrst column reports the employment share of each of the demographic group in the
restaurant workforce. The second and third column report the impact on a log point change
in the minimum wage on log average earnings (column 2) and share of employment (column
3). Teen workers in restaurants see earnings increases many times greater than adult restau-
rant workers. Yet, as the table indicates, none of the share - coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant or
15If a compositional change in the sample is induced by the minimum wage, a single index model suggests
that those changing categories from <1 quarter and >1 quarter of tenure are likely to have the lowest
separation propensity in the former group, and the highest separation propensity in the latter. As a result,
the compositional change is likely to make the separation elasticity estimate more negative in both groups.
Since we ﬁnd very strong reductions in separations in the former group and much smaller reductions in the
latter, the compositional story is unlikely to fully explain these patterns. However, absent better data, we
cannot rule this out.
14substantial. The implied share elasticities are modest (under -0.11 in magnitude) and never
statistically signiﬁcant. In all, we do not ﬁnd any labor-labor substitution along the age
and gender categories in our data. We also estimated outcomes separately by age, gender
and separately in full and limited service restaurants. The outcomes corresponded to what
would be predicted by the relative wage of each demographic group (results not reported in
the tables).
More generally, if minimum wage increases lead to a reallocation of workers, one would
expect a short term increase in gross ﬂows (separations and accessions). As we saw in
Table 4, the data suggests the opposite–both separations and accessions fall immediately
and the short and long run changes are quite similar. This lack of labor-labor substitution
sharpens the “anomaly” for the competitive model, and hence provides an additional reason
to consider models with labor market frictions, which we turn to next.16
4S t r u c t u r a l E s t i m a t i o n u s i n g R e d u c e d F o r m E l a s t i c i t i e s
Our key empirical results suggest that among the most aﬀected population, minimum wage
increases lead to sizeable earnings eﬀects, small eﬀects on employment levels, and larger
eﬀects on employment ﬂows. In this section we evaluate whether all three eﬀects are jointly
consistent with an equilibrium model with search frictions, and whether they are informative
about the degree of competition in the labor market. We develop this approach using the
Burdett-Mortensen model. BM present a model with search frictions in which employers
post wages. Both unemployed and employed workers receive oﬀers. Workers take the new
oﬀer if it is greater than either the reservation wage (in the case of an unemployed person),
or their present wage (in the case of an employed person). The interaction among ﬁrms and
workers leads to a non-degenerate equilibrium wage distribution–even though all ﬁrms are
identical, as are workers’ productivity levels.
We choose the BM model for several reasons. First, it provides a useful setting for un-
derstanding turnover and separation. As we discuss below, the equilibrium separations are
endogenous. The BM model makes joint predictions about eﬀect of minimum wage changes
on employment and turnover, which is attractive for our purposes. In the BM model a wage
dispersion emerges endogenously, with lower-wage ﬁrms facing greater equilibrium churn-
ing. By altering the wage distribution, the minimum wage policy can aﬀect equilibrium
separation rates. In contrast, in models such as Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) that do not
16Although not shown in the table, the canonical speciﬁcation does spuriously suggest substitution away
from teens and males and toward older workers and females. These results suggest the importance of
controls for spatial heterogeneity when testing for substitution eﬀects, just as is the case for employment
overall.
15incorporate on-the-job search, the steady-state separation rate turns out to be invariant to
the minimum wage policy. Second, BM is the most commonly used dynamic monopsony
model, and others such as Manning (2003), draw heavily from the BM model. The com-
petitive case is a limiting case in the BM model, which allows us to consider whether our
results are better explained by a labor market that is relatively monopsonistic or relatively
competitive. In terms of wage formation, diﬀerent search models have assumed either wage
posting or bargaining; the BM model assumes wage posting. We think this is a realistic
feature of the low-wage labor market. For example, Hall and Krueger (2008) present survey
evidence that points to wage posting as the most prevalent form in the low-wage U.S. labor
market. Moreover, as Mortensen (2003) points out, in the presence of on-the-job search,
changing the wage-posting assumption to a wage-bargaining assumption does not change
most of the qualitative results of the BM model. For these reasons, we opt to use the BM
model to interpret our reduced form empirical ﬁndings.
We use the extension of the BM model by BRV, which allows for heterogeneity in both
ﬁrm-level productivity and workers’ reservation wages. We begin by introducing the key
features of this model and then describe how we numerically compute the equilibrium av-
erage wage, employment level and average separation rate. We then use the reduced form
elasticities and pick likely parameter values that best reproduce these elasticities using both
maximum likelihood (implemented with simulated annealing) as well as Bayesian estimation
with MCMC. Finally, we characterize the extent of friction and market power implied by
the reduced-form estimates, simulate the eﬀects of a minimum wage increase, and discuss
the resulting implications for understanding the low-wage labor market.
4.1 Model Setup
There is a continuum of workers who are heterogeneous in their reservation wages and a
continuum of ﬁrms that are heterogeneous in productivity. The reservation wage b is dis-
tributed according to H(b). Oﬀers arrive at the rate of λ to both employed and unemployed
workers alike (the oﬀer rate will depend on the measure of surviving businesses as explained
below). Matches are destroyed at the rate δ, in which case a worker becomes unemployed.
A worker receiving a wage oﬀer can decide to accept it, remain at her existing job if she has
one, or remain unemployed (and receive b). Given the equality of the oﬀer arrival rate for
employed and unemployed, this leads to workers accepting all jobs that pay at least b. The
parameter κ = λ
δ represents the extent of search frictions, since it determines the relative
ease of ﬁnding out about job opportunities. A κ close to zero suggests a lot of friction, while
the labor market becomes increasingly competitive as κ tends to inﬁnity.
The marginal revenue product of labor p is distributed continuously according to Γ0(p),
16the potential productivity distribution. Firms oﬀer possibly diﬀerent wages, and this wage
oﬀer distribution is denoted as F(w) . The lowest wage oﬀered by ﬁrms, w,m a yb ee q u a l
to or greater than the statutory minimum wmin.I ft h es t a t u t o r ym i n i m u mi sg r e a t e rt h a n
p for a given ﬁrm, that ﬁrm will not produce. Consequently, the conditional (on survival)
ﬁrm productivity distribution is Γ(p)=
Γ0(p)
Γ0(wmin).A si nB R V ,t h ec o n t a c tr a t eλ depends on
the measure of surviving ﬁrms, and hence λ = λ0Γ0(wmin), where λ0 is the maximal contact
rate.
The proﬁts of a ﬁrm with productivity p is simply π(p)=( p − w) · l(w), where l(w) is
the number of workers the ﬁrm can recruit for a given wage w.Ah i g h e rw raises the unit
labor cost, but reduces the number of workers leaving for a better job and increases the
number of recruits.
As shown in Proposition 9 of BRV, under certain regularity condtions, there exists a
unique equilibrium wage function w = K(p) that is one-to-one, implying the wage oﬀer dis-
tribution is the convolution of the productivity distribution and the wage function: Γ(K(p)).
Higher productivity ﬁrms pay higher wages, leading to a nondegenerate oﬀer distribution
for identically productive workers. Lower productivity ﬁrms pay less, and have a higher
separation rate in steady state.















If there is a binding minimum wage, then w = wmin. Otherwise w = argmaxw(p −
w)H(w) as shown in Proposition 8 of BRV. The maximum wage is K(p). We will discuss
our speciﬁc parameterizations of Γ and H below, but if we can numerically solve for K(p),
we can then calculate wage oﬀer distribution Γ(w)=Γ ( K(p)). And as shown in BRV’s
Proposition 2, we can also calculate the equilibrium unemployment (or more accurately























Once we have numerically calculated the functions K(p) and G(w), and the equilibrium
unemployment rate u,w ec a na l s oc a l c u l a t et h em e a ns e p a r a t i o nr a t e ,m e a nw a g e sa n d
employment as follows. First, deﬁning e as the employment rate, we can use equation (4)
to calculate it:









The average wage level can be computed using the function G(w):




To compute the mean separation rate, we begin with the separation rate at a given ﬁrm.
For a given ﬁrm paying wage w,t h es e p a r a t i o nr a t es(w)=δ + λ(1 − F(w)) = δ + λF(w).
Matches dissolve at an exogenous rate δ and the ﬁrm’s workers receive better oﬀers (wage
above w)a tar a t eλF(w). The mean separation rate is the weighted average of the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc separation rates, where the weight comes from the distribution of equilibrium wages
G(w).
(8) E(s(w)) = δ + λ
´ w
w F(w)dG(w)
We will assume that the distribution of reservation wages H(w) and productivity Γ(w)
are both normal. The full vector of parameters in the model is then:
<λ 0,δ,µ h,σ h,µ p,σ p,w min >.F o rag i v e np a r a m e t e rv e c t o r ,w ec a nn u m e r i c a l l yi t e r a t e
on equation (3) to solve for wage function K(p),a n dt h e nf o rm e a nw a g eE(w), mean
separation rate E(s(w)), and employment rate e.W e c a n a l s o c a l c u l a t e t h e e l a s t i c i t i e s
of these three variables with respect to the minimum wage by numerically estimating the
derivatives of these function at a given minimum wage level. For minimum wage elasticities,
it can be shown that κ0 =
λ0
δ is a suﬃcient statistic for λ0 and δ. Therefore, for the purpose
of our structural estimation, we will deﬁne Θ= <κ 0,µ h,σ h,µ p,σ p,w min > as the vector of
model parameters in the discussion below.
4.2 Estimating the Model
In this section, we use the reduced-form elasticities to pick parameter values for the wage-
posting model using both classical and Bayesian methods. In particular, we pick the param-
eters in the model Θ=￿κ,µh,σ h,µ p,σ p,$7.25￿ that are best able to match the vector of the
three key empirical estimates for the teen sample–the average wage elasticity, the separation
rate elasticity and the employment elasticity, as well as the sample mean of the minimum
to mean wage ratio for teenagers–a measure of equilibrium wage dispersion.18 We use the
empirical elasticities from the teen sample, as this represents the entire workforce for that
demographic group as opposed to workers in a speciﬁc industry. Our approach implicitly
assumes that the minimum wage elasticities are measuring changes in steady state ﬂows, as
opposed to possible transitional dynamics. This assumption is supported by the evidence
18When we estimated the model with just the three elasticities, our estimate of the labor market friction
parameter κ was similar, but other parameter estimates were unstable and/or imprecise, and sometimes
suggested empirically unreasonable wage distributions. For this reason we use the additional information
about the minimum to mean wage ratio in our sample. Since the QWI only reports average earnings, we
estimated the minimum to mean wage ratio two ways. In the ﬁrst approach, which we use for our estimates,
we obtain average hours for teens under 19 years of age using the CPS for our sample period to convert
the hourly minimum wage to a weekly equivalent. We also calculated the minimum to mean wage ratio for
teens using the CPS directly; the results were nearly identical.
18in Table 3 that the accession and separation elasticities were quantiatively similar; and that
the short and long run elasticities in Table 4 were statistically indistinguishable.














E(w)￿ = ￿0.16,−0.21,−0.04,0.73￿.N o t e t h a t t h e
separations elasticity (as shown in Table 3) is the sum of the separation rate elasticity (-
0.21) and the employment elasticity (-0.04) and is hence -0.25. For our estimation, we set
the minimum wage level at $7.25, the existing federal minimum wage, which is also close
to the mean real minimum wage in 2011 dollars over the sample that is used to estimate
the minimum wage elasticities.19 As mentioned above, for the three elasticties, κ = λ
δ is a
suﬃcient statistic for these two variables. Therefore, we set δ to generate mean sepration
rates close to the sample mean. We pay particular attention to the following question: do
the empirical elasticities restrict the likely range of the model parameters in general, and
the extent of search frictions and wage-setting power in particular?
Our approach is similar to the estimation of DSGE model parameters by matching
impulse responses from vector autoregressions (e.g., Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin
2010). In our case, we will pick parameters to match our reduced-form elasticities. Our
approach can also be thought of as a form of indirect inference, which chooses the parameters
of a theoretical model to ensure that the the empirical and theoretical estimates of an
auxiliary model (in our case elasticities) are as close as possible (e.g., Gourieroux, Monfort,
and Renault 1993).
For a given vector of parameters Θ,w ec a nc o m p u t et h et h e o r e t i c a lq u a n t i t i e sY (Θ) =
￿y1(Θ),y 2(Θ),y 3(Θ),y 4(Θ)￿.A s s u m i n gt h a tt h ee s t i m a t e sa r ef r o mal a r g es a m p l e ,t h e
likelihood of oberving the empirical estimates ˆ Y for a given vector Θ can then be written as




.H e r eφ(.) is the multivariate Normal probability density func-
tion with the vector of means Y (Θ), and covariance matrix for the reduced form estimates,
ΣY. Since the latter is unknown, we proxy ΣY with its empirical counterpart ˆ ΣY.O n e
advantage of our approach over other structural approaches (including a full information
maximum likelihood estimation) is that the normality of the likelihood function comes from
the central limit theorem, not from any assumption about the distribution of the observa-
tions. As long as the reduced-form elasticities were estimated using a large sample, we know
the exact form of their joint distribution.
Based on this formulation, one approach is to pick the vector of parameters Θ that
maximizes the log likelihood ln
￿






ˆ Y,Y(Θ), ˆ ΣY
￿￿
. This limited informa-
tion maximum likelihood is our preferred approach, which we implement using simulated
annealing. We follow a simulation-based approach both because of the complicated nature
19The average minimum wage around all changes in the statutory minimum over this period was $7.35
in May 2011 dollars.
19of the likelihood function, and because simulated annealing is less likely to get trapped in
local optima than gradient-based methods. We use these estimates to conduct the policy
simulations in the next subsection.
We also provide Bayesian estimates of the posterior distribution of the model parameters
using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). The Bayesian approach is useful for understand-
ing how the empirical elasticities shift one’s priors over the key parameters, especially in the
context of a small number of elasticities used to ﬁt the model. We use uniform priors over a
wide range for each of the ﬁve parameters: κ0 ∼ U[0,100],µ h ∼ U[0,40],σ h ∼ U[0,40],µ p ∼
U[0,40],σ p ∼ U[0,40]. Given uniform priors, the posterior distribution is proportional to
the likelihood: π(Θ| ˆ Y )=
p(ˆ Y |Θ)·π(Θ)
p(ˆ Y ) ∝ p(ˆ Y |Θ).A sac o n s e q u e n c e ,t h em a x i m u ml i k e l i h o o d
estimate obtained using simulated annealing is also an estimate for the mode of the posterior
distribution (i.e., the maximum ap o s t e r i o r iprobability estimate) if we limit the solution to
being within the support of the priors. This is attractive because it allows us to discuss the
parameter estimates in a uniﬁed way as diﬀerent attributes of the same posterior density
function.
The mechanics of our MCMC and simulated annealing algorithms are quite similar, with
one key exception. In both cases, for each iteration i,w ed r a wac a n d i d a t ep a r a m e t e rv e c t o r
Θc
i using a random-walk Metropolis algorithm varying one parameter θj ∈ Θ at a time:
θc
i,j = θi−1,j + sj￿i.H e r e ￿i is a draw from the standard normal distribution, and sj is a
parameter-speciﬁc standard deviation whose calibration is described below. Also in both
cases, we use the candidate parameter vector Θc
i to numerically iterate on equation (3) and
solve for the wage function, compute the minimum wage elasticities and the minimum to
mean wage ratio, Y (Θc
i),a n dt h e nc o m p u t et h el o gl i k e l i h o o dln
￿




For the MCMC algorithm, the candicate vector Θc
i is accepted if
min
￿
e[lnp( ˆ Y |Θi−1)−lnp( ˆ Y |Θc
i)],1
￿
>U (0,1) and if the candidate vector falls within the
support of the prior distribution, where U(0,1) is a draw from the standard uniform distri-
bution. The standard deviations sj are set “on the ﬂy” in a burn-in period of 30,000 draws
to attain between 25 and 45 percent acceptance rates for each parameter (in practice this
ranged from 24.6 to 46.1 percent, with a mean of 33.9 percent). The post burn-in Markov
chain is 70,000 long, and this chain is used to estimate the posterior distribution.
For the simulated annealing algorithm, the acceptance threshold is raised over time to
focus in on the most likely parameter vector (in our case also an estimate of the posterior
mode) instead of sampling the entire posterior distribution. Here the candidate vector
Θc
i is accepted when min
￿
e




>U (0,1), where Ti = αTi−1 is a linear
cooling schedule with α ∈ (0,1).A st h e“ t e m p e r a t u r e ”Ti is reduced, candidate vectors are
rejected more often, until the estimates converge to the estimated optimum. The slower
20the cooling schedule (i.e., the larger is α), the less likely it is that the algorithm would get
trapped in local optima.20 We set the initial temperature T0 at 4 and use a fairly slow cooling
schedule with α =0 .97.W eu s et h es a m es t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o n ssj for the simulated annealing
procedure as in the MCMC (generated during the MCMC burn-in period). Convergence
obtained with around 2,000 draws.
4.3 Estimates of Model Parameters
Table 7 presents the results for the posterior mode (or MLE) using simulated annealing, as
well as the the posterior mean and the highest posterior density (HPD) credible intervals
using MCMC.21 Figure 1 presents the prior and posterior densities of the parameters. How
well do the parameter estimates using the posterior mode match the data? At the ﬁtted
values, the model-based average wage, employment and separation elasticities are 0.16, -
0.05, and -0.25, respectively; these compare with the empirical elasticities of 0.16, -0.04 and
-0.25. The predicted minimum to mean wage ratio is 0.74, as compared to the empirical
mean of 0.73. Overall, we are able to match the empirical elasticities and our measure of
wage dispersion almost exactly.
Arguably the most important parameter for this exercise is κ0,a si tm e a s u r e st h em a x -
imal contact rate to job destruction rate ratio, and provides an upper bound on the degree
of competition in the labor market. The posterior mode of this parameter (and the MLE
estimate) is 5.8. As shown visually in Figure 1, the posterior density of κ0 is clearly much
more concentrated as compared to the uniform prior. The 80 percent HPD credible interval
for κ0 is under 19, while the 90 percent HPD interval comfortably excludes the prior mean
(50). The right skew in the distribution does lead the posterior mean to be larger than the
mode.
Since the minimum wage causes some ﬁrms to not produce, the equilibrium κ is smaller
than κ0; as shown in Table 9, the posterior mode estimate of κ is equal to 4.9, while the 80
percent HPD interval is under 14, and the 90 percent HPD interval is under 27. Overall,
our estimates of κ suggest a substantial amount of friction in the low-wage labor market.
Interestingly, our posterior mode estimate is quite similar to what Moscarini and Postel-
Vinay (2009) use in their calibration to study macroeconomic ﬂuctuations: their baseline
value is 0.12
0.025 =4 .8.
Next, we turn to our other parameter estimates. The posterior mode for the mean of the
20For an example of simulated annealing used in search of the mode of the target distribution, see Chib
and Ramamurthy (2010). Use of simulated annealing in optimization is also discussed in Goﬀe et al. (1994)
and Chernozhukov and Hong (2003).
21Since we use a fairly limited amount of information to estimate these parameters, we do not report
asymptotic standard errors for the MLE
21productivity distribution is 8.97, while the mode for the standard deviation is 1.74. As we
show below in our model simulations using the ﬁtted data, this distribution of productivity
suggests small employment losses for most of the range of minimum wages observed in our
sample. Figure 1 and the highest probability density intervals show that the density of the
productivity parameters are concentrated around the mode and the mean.
In contrast to the parameters on labor market friction and the distribution of pro-
ductivity, the posterior densities of the reservation wage distribution parameters are quite
dispersed. Basically, our elasticity estimates and the minimum to mean wage ratio do not
pin down the reservation wage distribution very well.
The imprecision of our inference for these two parameters does not, however, prevent us
from drawing conclusions about what the minimum wage eﬀects suggest regarding friction
in the labor market. We have already discussed the credible intervals for κ.W e a l s o
consider other measures. When evaluated at the ﬁtted parameter values (i.e., at the posterior
mode), the average wage-to-productivity ratio is 0.89, suggesting that monoposonistic wage-
setting practices reduce the relevant average wages by around 11 percent, which is similar in
magnitude to estimates of union wage eﬀects as well as race and gender wage diﬀerentials in
the U.S. A related metric for measuring wage-setting power by ﬁrms is the ﬁrm-level labor
supply elasticity. For a given ﬁrm in the model, proﬁt maximization implies that the labor
supply elasticity is equal to w
p−w.B a s e do no u rp o s t e r i o rm o d ee s t i m a t e ,t h e( e m p l o y m e n t
weighted) measure of the ﬁrm-level labor supply elasticity is around 8.5 for a minimum
wage of $7.25/hour, although it is lower at 6.5 if the minimum wage were set at $5.15/hour
(the latter results are shown in Table 8). The posterior mean (at $7.25 minimum wage) is
around 9.3, and the 80 percent HPD intervals for the ﬁrm-level labor supply elasticity as
shown in Table 9 is (3.8, 14,7). Overall, we think a 4 to 10 range likely captures the average
ﬁrm-level labor supply elasticity in the low-wage labor market (this is also close to the 66%
HPD interval for the measure).
A4t o1 0r a n g es u g g e t sas u b s t a n t i a la m o u n to fw a g e - s e t t i n gp o w e ri nt h el o ww a g e
labor market. Although the estimates are somewhat larger than many of the ﬁrm-level
studies discussed in Ashenfelter, Farber and Ransom (2010), as well as the 2 to 5 range
originally posited by Card and Krueger (1995), the discrepancy is not surprising. Many
of the ﬁrm-based studies often examine larger ﬁrms– for whom the model suggests greater
monopsony power. In our model, while monopsony power at the larger ﬁrms is substantially
higher, averaging across the entire low-wage labor market still suggets a sizeable average
extent of wage-setting power.
It is also instructive to compare our estimate of the ﬁrm-level labor supply elasticity to
a“ n a i v e ”e s t i m a t eu s i n gt h es e p a r a t i o ne l a s t i c i t ya l o n ea n dt r e a t i n gt h ep o l i c yc h a n g ea sa n
22increase in wages in a single ﬁrm. As Manning (2003) explains, under certain assumptions
the ﬁrm-level labor supply elasticity is two times its separation elasticity. Dividing the
minimum wage elasticity of separation (-0.25) by the minimum wage elasticity of the average
wage (0.14), we would obtain an average wage elasticity of separation of -1.79, suggesting
al a b o rs u p p l ye l a s t i c i t yo f2 × 1.79 = 3.6. This is below the 4 to 10 range for the ﬁrm
labor supply elasticity. But this is also to be expected, since the “naive” estimate does not
account for the rise in wages in some competing ﬁrms.
Overall, we want to highlight three conclusions from this exercise. First, the minimum
wage elasticities for wages, employment and separations are most consistent with a labor
market with a sizeable amount of search friction and monopsony power. By considering
am o d e lt h a te m b e d st h ec o m p e t i t i v ec a s ea sap a r a m e t r i cr e s t r i c t i o n ,w ea r ea b l et od i -
rectly assess what the minimum wage eﬀects imply about the nature of competition in
the low-wage labor market. Second, our consideration of employment ﬂows in addition to
employment levels provides us with additional testable propositions, which we use in our
estimation exercise. Finally, while structural estimates of the BM-BRV model with such
heterogeneity have existed for some time (e.g., BRV 1999), our contribution lies in estimat-
ing well-identiﬁed reduced-form responses using a quasi-experimental research design and
then using these estimates to infer the degree of search frictions suggested by the model.
We think our approach provides a fruitful and transparent means to bridge labor market
empirics and theory.
Of course, we use only a limited number of reduced-form estimates, which by necessity
prevents us from tightly estimating some of the model parameters. Using other information
such as ﬁrm-level wages and employment ﬂows and other moment conditions would help
in this regard. However, our goal was to learn what (if anything) can be inferred from
the reduced-form minimum wage elasticities to estimate the extent of search frictions and
wage setting power. It is quite telling that the data strongly points us away from a highly
competitive market and suggest that frictions are important for understanding minimum
wage eﬀects.
4.4 Policy Simulation
How does an increase in the minimum wage aﬀect the average wage, overall employment
levels and ﬂows, as well as proﬁts and productivity? To answer this question, we numerically
simulate the ﬁtted model based on our maximum likelihood estimate (also the posterior
mode), while varying the minimum wage from $5.15 to $7.25. We choose these values for
the minimum wage because they equal the two recent levels of the federal minimum wage
in nominal dollars.
23We show the simulation ﬁndings using two sets of results. In Figure 2, we show how the
wage, employment, proﬁt, and separation loci (as a function of ﬁrm-level productivity) shift
when the minimum wage changes discretely from $5.15 to $7.25. In Table 8, we show how
mean wage, employment, productivity and separation rates change as we vary the minimum
wage from $5.15 to $7.25.
Figure 2 plots the ﬁrm-level wage, employment and separation rate as a function of
productivity p. As shown in the ﬁgure, the higher minimum cuts oﬀ the bottom tail of the
ﬁrm-productivity distribution. At p =$ 7 .25,t h ew a g er i s e st om e e tt h en e wr e q u i r e m e n t .
However, wages rise at ﬁrms with productivity greater than $7.25 as well, representing a
spillover eﬀect along the wage distribution. Overall, as Table 8 shows, the average wage
inceases 3.4 percent, from $9.38 to $9.70.
Figure 2 also shows that employment falls to zero in ﬁrms with productivity between the
old and the new minimum wage. Overall, total employment falls by 0.5 percent, implying
an average minimum wage elasticity of employment of -0.01 (smaller in magnitude than the
marginal elasticity of -0.04). Employment and proﬁts fall in ﬁrms with greater productivity.
As the (surviving) lower-productivity ﬁrms pay higher wages, they create more competitive
pressure in the labor market, reducing employment at higher wage ﬁrms. This increase in
competition occurs in spite of the fact that the contact rate λ = λ0Γ0(wmin) is declining
with minimum wage as some ﬁrms go out of business. This pro-competitive eﬀect is also
reﬂected in Table 8, which shows a rise in the ﬁrm-level labor supply elasticity from 6.5
to 8.5, indicating a more competitive labor market. Overall proﬁts decline by around 20
percent (results not shown in the table).
As Figure 2 shows, the separation rate is lower at ﬁrms with greater productivity (and
wage), since they have fewer competitors to whom they lose workers. A higher mini-
mum wage simply truncates the separation rate-productivity locus from the bottom and
does not change the shape of the locus. This occurs because a surviving ﬁrm with pro-








= λ0Γ0(p), which is invariant to the minimum wage. By
reducing the number of low-productivity ﬁrms, a higher minimum wage also reduces the
number of high-separation ﬁrms and hence tends to reduce the mean separation rate. In
our policy experiment, the overall fall in separations, which equals the sum of the decline
in the separation rate (3.6 percent) plus the decline in employment (0.5 percent), amounts
to 4.1 percent.
To sum up, the ﬁtted model suggests that a 41 percent increase in the minimum wage
(from $5.15 to $7.25) leads to a 3.4 percent increase in the average wage in the relevant labor
force. This wage increase is met with a 0.5 percent reduction in employment, a 0.7 percent
24increase in average productivity due to reallocation of workers, and a 4.1 percent reduction
in separations. The relatively small job loss is aﬀorded by the increased competitiveness in
the labor market, which reduces proﬁts, as well as the small increase in productivity due to
the reallocation of workers across ﬁrms.
5D i s c u s s i o n a n d C o n c l u s i o n
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we provide policy-relevant minimum wage
elasticities of employment, earnings and separations for teens as well as for a high impact
industry–restaurants. Second, we use well-identiﬁed reduced-form elasticities along with a
simple measure of equilibrium wage dispersion to estimate the parameters of an equilbrium
model with wage posting. Our approach allows us to directly assess the importance of search
frictions in the low-wage labor market, especially in mediating the eﬀects of minimum wage
increases.
Our border discontinuity design shows that even though teen and restaurant employ-
ment levels remain stable in response to a minimum wage increase, employment ﬂows fall
substantially. Average separations, hires and turnover rates decline signiﬁcantly among teen
workers and restaurant establishments. The changes are immediate (within one quarter)
of the minimum wage increase and they persist. Our data also permits us to test directly
whether the absence of an employment eﬀect in the restaurant sector simply reﬂects the
substitution of older workers for teens. We do not detect any such labor-labor substitution
in restaurants in response to minimum wage increases. These ﬁndings clarify and strengthen
the evidence for the argument that the no-disemployment ﬁnding is indeed an anomaly for
the purely competitive model.
A number of researchers (Card and Krueger 1995; Ashenfelter, Farber and Ransom
2010) have suggested that the anomaly may be explainable in a dynamic monopsony model.
In this model, higher wages attract more workers to the ﬁrm and fewer quit, which may
even increase the proﬁt-maximizing level of employment. This simple ﬁrm-level dynamic
monopsony model thus suggests that a minimum wage increase may reduce labor market
ﬂows rather than employment levels.
However, the simple ﬁrm-level dynamic monopsony story does not provide clear im-
plications for equilibrium responses, as it does not take into account interactions among
ﬁrms and workers. To account for such equilbrium eﬀects, we use the Burdett-Mortensen
wage-posting framework, which explicitly models these interactions. The equilibrium wage
dispersion in the model causes excess churning in the labor market. We advance the liter-
ature by linking well-identiﬁed reduced-form estimates from the teen labor market to the
25model’s parameters using both LIML and Bayesian approaches.
The ﬁtted model is able to rationalize sizeable wage eﬀects, small employment eﬀects and
larger separation eﬀects. The mean separation rate tends to decline with minimum wage in-
creases, as the minimum wage shifts the employment distribution away from high-turnover,
low-wage ﬁrms to low-turnover, high-wage ones. The posterior densities clearly point to
the importance of search friction and monopsony in this labor market: our results point to
average ﬁrm-level labor supply elasticities in the 4 to 10 range. Our policy simulations show
that moving the minimum wage up from $5.15 to $7.25 generates a 3.4 percent increase in
the average teen wage, while reducing employment by less than 0.4 percent and reducing
separations by around 2 percent. Even though some businesses may stop hiring, the in-
creased competition among surviving businesses mostly compensates for that employment
loss.
Future work could build on our approach by considering a wider set of minimum wage
responses, including across diﬀerent types of ﬁrms–a fruitful avenue for future research
using ﬁrm-level data. Moreover, the model also has implications for how minimum wage
aﬀects diﬀerent types of ﬂows–employment to non-employment, as well as employment to
employment transitions. Finally, the model could also be expanded to allow for eﬀects on
output prices. Aaronson and French (2006) argue that their ﬁndings on price pass-through
cast doubt on the monopsony model as an explanation for small employment changes.
Future research could examine the possible role of price pass-through by further expanding
the BRV model with a price-setting component.
Our results indicate that the low-wage labor market in the United States contains a
substantial amount of search friction and that it deviates from a purely competitive de-
scription. Therefore, the eﬀects of minimum wage policies tend to be more complicated. By
compressing the wage distribution, minimum wage increases can reduce the churning that
characterize the low-wage segment of the labor market. As a consequence, a properly de-
signed minimum wage policy has the possibility of improving the structure and functioning
of the low wage labor market without substantially aﬀecting employment.
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Figure 1  
Prior and Posterior Densities from MCMC Estimation 
 
Notes. The figure shows the (uniform) prior and the posterior distribution of the model parameters: 
the ratio of the maximal contact rate to job destruction rate (!0), the mean and standard deviations 
of the reservation wage distribution, (µ!, "!) and the mean and standard deviations of the firm 
productivity distribution, (µ!, "!).  The posterior densities were estimated using MCMC based on 
the  likelihood  of  observing  the  empirical  minimum  wage  elasticities  of  average  wage, 
employment, and separation of 0.16, -0.04 and -0.25, respectively, and a minimum to average 













Outcomes by Firm-Productivity Levels – Raising the Minimum Wage from $5.15 to $7.25 
!
Notes.  The  policy  experiment  simulates  the  fitted  model  based  on  the  MLE/posterior  mode 
estimates  from  column  1  of  Table  7.  The  figure  shows  firm  level  outcomes  (wage,  profits, 
employment and separation rate), density of firms, and density of workers by firm-productivity 
level. The dotted lines in blue represents the outcomes when the minimum wage is $5.15/hour, 








Comparing Samples in the QWI Data 
 














All                
   Monthly 
Earnings  2,326  457  789    2,323  453  782 
  (st. dev)  585  134  238    587  131  221 
               
Employment  40,564  1,383  2,945    38,055  1,290  2,748 
  (st. dev)  143,386  3,952  9,558    125,310  3,272  8,097 
               
Hire rates  0.224  0.686  0.440    0.230  0.697  0.446 
  (st. dev)  0.092  0.382  0.194    0.091  0.369  0.189 
               
Separation rates  0.217  0.557  0.432    0.222  0.562  0.440 
  (st. dev)  0.072  0.264  0.149    0.074  0.225  0.181 
               
Turnover Rate  0.220  0.618  0.433    0.220  0.618  0.433 
   (st. dev)  0.074  0.327  0.158    0.073  0.350  0.159 
 
Tenure > 1 
quarter               
Monthly Earnings  2,548  562  939    2,537  557  929 
  (st. dev)  650  176  276    647  175  269 
               
Employment  35,139  952  2,248    32,992  888  2,095 
  (st. dev)  125,217  2,761  7,558    109,714  2,269  6,366 
               
Hire rates  0.104  0.308  0.200    0.106  0.308  0.204 
  (st. dev)  0.034  0.085  0.056    0.036  0.085  0.059 
               
Separation rates  0.102  0.221  0.198    0.104  0.224  0.204 
  (st. dev)  0.041  0.082  0.081    0.046  0.082  0.087 
               
Turnover Rate  0.103  0.265  0.202    0.103  0.266  0.203 
     (st. dev)  0.028  0.077  0.084    0.027  0.078  0.081 
               
Number of  
  counties    2,960      1,063 
Number of county 
  pairs           NA     1,169 
 
Notes. Sample means are reported for all counties in the US and for all contiguous border county 
pairs with a full balanced panel of observations. Standard deviations are shown in italics below the 
means. Monthly earnings are in nominal dollars. Turnover rates are quarterly. Sample sizes vary by 
demographic group, industry and tenure and ranges from 28,000 to 66,112. Sample period is from 




Descriptive Statistics  
 




25 +  Females  Males 
Restaurant 
Workers 
All              
Monthly Earnings  453  952  2,559  1,784  2,856  782 
  131  220  594  452  741  221 
           
 
Employment  1,290  2,055  40,679  18,779  19,276  2,748 
  3,272  5,736  126,186  61,549  63,831  8,097 
           
 
Hiring Rate  0.697  0.551  0.189  0.219  0.243  0.446 
  0.369  0.234  0.061  0.089  0.104  0.189 
           
 
Separation Rate  0.562  0.524  0.189  0.211  0.234  0.440 
  0.225  0.165  0.057  0.072  0.084  0.181 
           
 
Turnover Rate  0.618  0.527  0.182  0.209  0.232  0.433 
  0.350  0.169  0.055  0.071  0.082  0.159 
             
Tenure >1 quarter             
Monthly Earnings  557  1,144  2,774  1,953  3,125  929 
  175  259  638  508  809  269 
           
 
Employment  888  1,453  37,217  16,337  16,655  2,095 
  2,269  4,104  113,957  54,021  55,753  6,366 
           
 
Hiring Rate  0.308  0.245  0.091  0.105  0.107  0.204 
  0.085  0.060  0.026  0.038  0.039  0.059 
           
 
Separation Rate  0.224  0.227  0.092  0.103  0.105  0.204 
  0.082  0.071  0.026  0.051  0.049  0.087 
           
 
Turnover Rate  0.266  0.237  0.091  0.102  0.104  0.203 
  0.078  0.063  0.020  0.030  0.030  0.081 
 
Notes. Sample means are reported for all contiguous border county pairs with a full balanced panel 
of observations. Standard deviations are shown in italics below the means. Monthly earnings are in 
nominal dollars. Turnover rates are quarterly. Teens are of ages 14-18; young adults are of ages 
19-24.  Sample sizes vary by demographic group, industry and tenure and ranges from 28,000 to 









Minimum Wage Elasticities for Earnings, Employment Level and Flows 
 
  Teens    Restaurant Workers 
Dependent Variable  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
           
ln Earnings     0.107
**      0.161
**         0.169
***       0.213
*** 
  (0.048)  (0.064)    (0.035)  (0.072) 
           
ln Employment       -0.200
***  -0.039        -0.121
***  -0.057 
  (0.066)   (0.065)    (0.043)   (0.104) 
           
ln Hires       -0.454
***    -0.224
**        -0.466
***    -0.342
** 
  (0.089)  (0.111)    (0.081)  (0.172) 
           
ln Separations       -0.463
***     -0.253
**        -0.468
***     -0.319
** 
  (0.096)  (0.102)    (0.076)  (0.133) 
           
ln Turnover Rate        -0.266
***    -0.194
**         -0.327
***     -0.257
** 
  (0.066)  (0.079)    (0.072)  (0.123) 
Controls:           
Common time effects  Y      Y   
Pair-specific time effects    Y      Y 
 
Notes.  Sample  sizes  in  regressions  range  from  46,944  to  59520,  depending  on  sample  (due  to 
nondisclosure policy). All regressions include controls for natural log of county population and 
total private sector employment. Specifications 1 and 2 provide estimates for all teens aged 14-18 
regardless  of  industry.  Specifications  3-4  are  limited  to  all  workers  in  the  restaurant  industry 
(NAICS 722). All samples and specifications include county fixed-effects.  Specifications 1 and 3 
include  common  time  period  fixed-effects.  For  specifications  2  and  4,  period  fixed-effects  are 
interacted with each county-pair. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state 
and border segment levels for all regressions. Significance levels are indicated by:  
* for 10%, 
** for 
5%, and 




Minimum Wage Elasticities - Robustness Checks 
 
   Teens      Restaurant Workers 
 
(1)  (2)    (3)   
 
(4)  (5)    (6)   
Dependent variable      lnMWt+4    lnMWt  lnMWt-4         lnMWt+4    lnMWt  lnMWt-4 
                       
ln Earnings      0.193
***      0.158
**  -0.047  0.105  -0.012       0.193
**      0.212
***  0.033  0.224
**  0.010 
                        (0.063)  (0.065)  (0.053)  (0.087)  (0.047)    (0.083)     (0.071)  (0.067)  (0.099)  (0.056) 
                       
ln Employment     -0.022  -0.039  0.051  -0.012  0.026    -0.038     -0.057  0.069  -0.017  -0.013 
                         (0.074)  (0.065)  (0.066)  (0.085)  (0.077)    (0.106)     (0.104)  (0.066)  (0.106)  (0.128) 
                       
ln Hires     -0.242
*  -0.154  -0.052  -0.243
*  -0.021    -0.323
*     -0.292
*  -0.108  -0.429
*  -0.058 
                         (0.133)  (0.100)  (0.096)  (0.144)  (0.149)    (0.193)     (0.169)  (0.115)  (0.220)  (0.196) 
                        ln Separations  -0.277
**     -0.193
**  -0.061  -0.312
**  0.052       -0.316
**      -0.294
**  -0.025  -0.354
*  -0.059 
                        (0.117)  (0.091)  (0.100)  (0.145)  (0.122)    (0.148)      (0.137)  (0.098)  (0.179)  (0.137) 
                       
ln Turnover Rate  -0.212
**   -0.129
*  -0.118  -0.252
**  -0.037    -0.264
*  -0.222
*  -0.125  -0.347
**  -0.047 
                        (0.093)  (0.070)  (0.092)  (0.112)  (0.107)    (0.147)  (0.118)  (0.109)  (0.173)  (0.151) 
Controls:       ! ! !             
County size <2000 sq. mi.  Y            Y         
All priv. sector ln(outcome)    Y            Y       
Lead and lag ln(MW)      Y  Y  Y         Y  Y  Y 
 
Notes. Sample sizes in regressions range from 50,912 to 58,848.  All regressions include controls for log of county population and pair-
specific time effects.  Specifications 1-3 provide estimates for all teens 14-18 regardless of industry. Columns 4-6 are limited to all workers 
in the restaurant industry (NAICS 722). Columns 1 and 6 restrict the sample to counties of less than 2000 square miles. Columns 2 and 5 
include as controls the value of the dependent variable for all workers in the county’s private sector (i.e. rather than the group in focus, e.g., 
teens).  Specifications 3 and 6 include a 4-quarter lead and lag in the minimum wage to control for pre-existing trends and delayed effects. 
All samples and specifications include county pair-specific time effects. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state and 
border segment levels for all regressions.  Significance levels are indicated by:  
* for 10%, 
** for 5%, and 
*** for 1%. ! 36!
Table 5 
Minimum Wage Elasticities - Effects by Tenure 
 
   Teens    Restaurant Workers 
Dependent 
Variable  (1)   (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
    All   Tenure>1q      All   Tenure>1q 
Fraction Short-
Term (tenure<1q)      -0.026          -0.039
**     
   (0.018)        (0.020)     
               
ln Earnings        0.161
**   0.135
*     
      
0.213
***     0.167
** 
     (0.064)  (0.068)      (0.072)  (0.071) 
               
ln Employment    -0.039  -0.002      -0.057  0.003 
    (0.065)  (0.072)      (0.104)  (0.108) 
               
ln Hires        -0.224
**  -0.147          -0.342
**  -0.058 
    (0.111)  (0.098)      (0.172)   (0.113) 
               
ln Separations       -0.253
**  -0.113          -0.319
**  -0.028 
    (0.102)   (0.073)       (0.133)  (0.119) 
               
ln Turnover Rate       -0.194
**  -0.096          -0.257
**  -0.148 
                         (0.079)   (0.087)      (0.123)   (0.108) 
   
Notes.  Sample  sizes  in  regressions  range  from  38,080  to  65,689,  depending  on  sample.  All 
regressions include controls for natural log of county population, total private sector employment 
and  pair-specific  time  effects.  Specifications  1-3  provide  estimates  for  all  teens  14-18  in  the 
private sector. Specifications 4-6 provide estimates for all restaurant workers. All samples and 
specifications include county fixed-effects as well as  period fixed-effects interacted with each 
county-pair. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state and border segment 
levels for all regressions.  Significance levels are indicated by:  
* for 10%, 




Labor-Labor Substitution within Restaurants 
 
      Dependent Variable 
  Employment Share    ln Earnings     
Employment 
Share  
           
Male  0.651    0.182
*           0.009    
                          (0.103)         (0.023)    
           
Female  0.355         0.242
***          -0.008    
                          (0.057)         (0.025)    
           
Teen    0.234         0.404
***          -0.024    
                          (0.085)         (0.021)    
           
Young Adult  0.149         0.300
***           0.000    
                          (0.087)         (0.011)    
           
Adult 25+   0.624    0.101           0.016    
                          (0.088)         (0.023)    
 
Notes.  Column  1  reports  the  employment  share  of  each  demographic  group  in  the  overall 
restaurant workforce. Columns 2 and 3 report the regression coefficient associated with log of 
the minimum wage. In column 2, the outcome is the log of average earnings; the coefficient is, 
therefore, the minimum wage elasticity of average earnings.  In column 3, the outcomes are the 
demographic group’s share of overall restaurant employment. Teens are of ages 14-18; young 
adults are of ages 19-24. All regressions include controls for natural log of county population, 
total private sector employment and pair-specific time effects. Sample sizes in regressions range 
from  37,504  to  56,736,  depending  on  sample.  Robust  standard  errors,  in  parentheses,  are 
clustered  at  the  state  and  border  segment  levels  for  all  regressions.  Significance  levels  are 
indicated by:  
* for 10%, 
** for 5%, and 
*** for 1%. 
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Table 7 





Mean    80% HPD    90% HPD 
!"#"$%&%#'()&*$"&%)+'              
  !0    5.82  10.07    (2.01, 18.51)    (1.73, 33.00) 
  µ!" ! 21.58  4.78    (0.00, 20.28)    (0.00, 25.08) 
  "!" ! 30.20  6.23    (20.61, 39.99)    (7.10, 40.00) 
  µ#" ! 8.97  8.53    (7.94, 10.09)    (7.08, 10.59) 
  """ ! 1.74  4.19    (0.66, 2.93)     (0.56, 3.75) 
  !            
Equilibrium Quantities:  !            
Average Firm Labor Supply 
Elasticity [(p-w)/w] 
! 8.49   9.31     (3.76, 14.73)    (3.42, 20.10) 
Equilibrium contact-to-job 
destruction ratio (!) 
! 4.88  7.14    (0.75, 9.11)    (0.63, 17.47) 





Average wage elasticity  ! 0.16  0.09         
Employment elasticity  ! -0.05  -0.05         
 Separation elasticity 
 
! -0.25  -0.32         
Minimum-to-Mean Wage 
Ratio 
! 0.74  0.70         
  ! ! ! ! ! ! !   
Notes.  The top panel reports two sets of estimates. Column 1 reports the MLE for the parameters using 
simulated annealing, while columns 2-4 report the posterior mean and 80% and 90% highest posterior 
density credible intervals using MCMC. Given the uniform priors, the ML estimate is also an estimate of 
the posterior mode. The primitives of the model are the ratio of maximal contact rate to job destruction 
rate (!0), the mean and standard deviations of the reservation wage distribution, (µ!, "!) and the mean and 
standard  deviations  of  the  firm  productivity  distribution,  (µ!,  "!).  In  the  middle  panel,  we  report  the 
MLE/posterior mode, posterior mean, and highest posterior density intervals of (p-w)/w, which is the firm-
level labor supply elasticity, and ! which is the equilibrium ratio of contact rate to job destruction rate 
evaluated at a minimum wage of $7.25. In the bottom panel, we report the model generated minimum 
wage elasticities (of average wage, employment and separation) and the minimum-to-mean wage ratio 
using both the MLE/posterior mode and the posterior mean parameter estimates. The three empirical 
elasticities used to fit the model are 0.16, -0.04 and -0.25, respectively; the sample mean of the minimum-
to-mean wage ratio is 0.73. ! 39!
Table 8 
Policy Experiment: Raising the Minimum Wage from $5.15 to $7.25 
  MW=5.15    MW=7.25 
       
Average wage  $9.38    $9.70 
       
Average productivity  $10.90    $10.98 
       
Average wage to productivity ratio  0.86    0.89 
       
Average firm-level labor supply 
elasticity  6.47    8.49 
       
Employment to population ratio  0.854    0.851 
       
Average separation rate  0.427    0.408 
 
Notes.  The  policy  experiment  simulates  the  fitted  model  based  on  the  MLE/posterior  mode 
estimates from column 1 of Table 9. The first column reports the results from a simulation using 
a minimum wage of $5.15/hour, while the second column’s results use a minimum wage of 
$7.25/hour.  The  average  wage,  average  productivity  and  average  separation  rate  are  all 
employment-weighted  averages  across  firms.  The  wage  to  productivity  ratio  (w/p)  and  the 
average firm-level labor supply elasticity (p-w)/p are calculated analogously. 
 